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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: FOURTH AMENDMENT 
  
Summary 
 
The Court determined (1) an investigative stop under NRS 171.123 is transformed into 
an illegal seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment when an officer retains a pedestrian’s 
identification after the suspicion for the original encounter is cured and there is no longer 
reasonable suspicion to detain the pedestrian; (2) without reasonable suspicion, the discovery of 
an arrest warrant cannot purge the taint from an illegal seizure.  
 
Background 
 
In February 2008, believing Ralph Torres to be drunk and out past curfew, Officer Shelley 
stopped him as he walked over a bridge in Elko, Nevada. Torres gave Officer Shelley his 
California identification card (“ID card”), which revealed Torres was old enough to be out past 
curfew and consuming alcohol. Although nothing indicated Torres’s ID card was fake or 
inaccurate, Officer Shelley retained the ID card and called dispatch to verify Torres’s ID, at which 
time Officer Shelley learned Torres had two outstanding arrest warrants from California. Officer 
Shelley took Torres into custody, conducting a search incident to arrest, at which time Torres 
informed him he had a gun in his pocket. 
Torres was charged with being an ex-felon in possession of a firearm, receiving or 
possessing stolen goods, and carrying a concealed weapon. Torres filed a motion to suppress the 
handgun evidence in district court, claiming Officer Shelley conducted an illegal seizure that 
resulted in the discovery of the firearm. Further, Torres claimed the discovery of the outstanding 
warrants was not an intervening circumstance sufficient to purge the taint of the discovery of the 
handgun, and sought to have the charges dismissed. 
The State, however, contended that Officer Shelley had reasonable suspicion, that Torres 
consented to the encounter, and that the discovery of the warrant was an intervening circumstance 
sufficient to purge the taint. The State argued, therefore, that the handgun evidence was not the 
fruit of an illegal seizure. 
 Torres filed a motion to suppress in the district court against the State of Nevada, which 
the district court denied, finding that the initial contact between Torres and Officer Shelley was 
consensual. Rather than determining whether the consensual encounter became an illegal seizure, 
the district court found the warrant to be an intervening circumstance sufficient to purge the 
illegality of the seizure if the stop had become illegal.  
 Upon the district court’s denial of Torres’s motion to suppress, Torres pleaded guilty to 
being an ex-felon in possession of a firearm.2  This appeal followed. 
 
Discussion 
 
 The court was required to first determine whether Officer Shelley's continued detention of 
Torres constituted an illegal seizure. If so, the court was required to decide whether the discovery 
of Torres's valid arrest warrant attenuated the taint from the illegal seizure, such that the firearm 
evidence obtained during a search incident to arrest was admissible. 
 
Officer Shelley's continued detention of Torres resulted in an illegal seizure in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment  
 
While police encounters can be consensual, if a reasonable person would not feel free to 
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  Pursuant to NEV. REV. STAT. 202.360(1)(a) 
leave he has been “seized” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.3 Even if a person does not 
consent, police officers may conduct a brief investigative stop, so long as the officer has objective 
justification for detaining a person, and is not acting on a hunch that criminal activity is occurring.4 
Further, for an investigative stop to be reasonable, it must “last no longer than is necessary.”5 "[T]he 
nature of the police-citizen encounter can change—what may begin as a consensual encounter 
may change to an investigative detention if the police conduct changes"6 such that the person no 
longer feels free to leave.  
Though courts disagree on whether a seizure has occurred for Fourth Amendment purposes 
when the police retain an individual’s identification, the Court held that “a reasonable person would 
not feel free to leave when an officer retains a pedestrian’s identification after the facts giving rise to 
articulable suspicion for the original stop had been satisfied.”7  
Here, Officer Shelley testified that he stopped Torres because Officer Shelley thought 
Torres was a minor out past curfew and too young to be drinking. Once Torres produced his ID 
card verifying he was not a minor and over the age of 21, the suspicion for the original encounter 
was cured and Officer Shelley no longer had reasonable suspicion to detain Torres. 
 
The firearm evidence should have been suppressed because it was the fruit of an illegal seizure 
 
 Unless the Fourth Amendment violation is far enough removed from the acquisition of 
evidence as to “dissipate the taint,” 8 courts must exclude evidence obtained as “indirect fruits of an 
illegal search or arrest.”9  Despite the State’s urging, the Court chose not to apply the three-factor 
test from Brown as here there was no demonstration of an act of free will by Torres to purge the 
taint caused by the illegal seizure. 10 Agreeing with the Ninth and Tenth Circuits, as well as the 
Supreme Court of Tennessee, the Court held that without reasonable suspicion, the discovery of 
arrest warrants cannot purge the taint from illegal seizures.11 Here, since Officer Shelley did not 
have reasonable suspicion to justify the seizure under NRS 171.123(4), and there was no intervening 
circumstance to purge the taint of the illegal seizure, the evidence discovered should have been 
suppressed in the district court. 
  
Conclusion 
 
 The Court found the further detention of Torres was not consensual, and Officer Shelley 
retained Torres’s ID card longer than necessary, rendering Torres unable to leave. The continued 
detention of Torres transformed an investigative stop into an illegal seizure in violation of the Fourth 
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Amendment and no intervening circumstance purged the taint of the illegal seizure. Thus, the evidence 
of the firearm should have been suppressed. Accordingly, the Court reversed the judgment of 
conviction and remands the matter to the district court to allow Torres to withdraw his guilty plea. 
